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18 IRVINE v. GIBSON. [19 C. (2d) 
valuable effort and time, as well as money presenting the 
case, and a decision thereon has been rendered on the merits 
by the District Court of Appeal, and a hearing granted by 
this court. While it may be true as a general rule that this 
court in its discretion may refuse to issue the writ for the 
reasons advanced in the majority opinion, I believe that under 
the circumstances here presented, technicalities and form 
should give way to considerations of public importance and 
fair treatment of counsel and the litigants here involved. No 
useful purpose can be served by compelling' the parties to 
litigate the cause anew in the superior court. An appeal 
would in all probability be taken from any judgment entered 
therein. The whole subject would have to be again briefed 
and presented to an appellate court and a decision prepared 
by the latter. To require that unnecessary delay and repe-
tition is not consonant with the function of courts or with the 
worthy policy of speeding up the judicial machinery to the 
end that justice shall be a reality rather than a myth. 
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied Decem-
ber 11, 1941. Shenk~, J., and Carter J., voted for a rehearing. 
~ 
Nov. 1941.] ARCHER V. CITY OF Los 'ANGELES. 19 
[L. A. No. 17613. In Bank. Nov. 14, 1941.] 
AGATHA ARCHER et aI., Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS 
'ANGELES (a Municipal Corporation) et aI., Re-
spondents. 
[L. A. No. 17612. In Bank. Nov. 14, 1941.] 
JAMES L. ALLISON et aI., Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS 
ANGELES (a Municipal Corporation) et aI., Re-
spondents. 
[1] Dismissal-Upon Failure of Proof-When Motion Granted.-
A nonsuit should be granted only when, accepting 'the full 
force of the evidence adduced, together with ev:ery reasonable 
inference favorable to the plaintiff, and excluding all evidence 
in conflict therewith, it appears that the plaintiff is precluded 
from recovering a judgment. 
[2] Constitutional Law-Police POlwer-Right to Damages.-The 
state or its subdivisions may take or damage private property: 
without compensation if such action :isessential to safeguard 
public health, safety or morals, but in certain' circumstances 
the taking or damaging of private property for such a purpose 
is not prompted by so great a necessity as to be justified with-
out proper compensation to the owner. 
[3] Eminent Domain-Compensation-Necessity for and Right to-
-State Constitutional Guaranty.-The liability of the state' 
under Const. art. I, § 14, for compensation to the owner of 
private property taken for public use, arises when the taking 
or damaging is not so essential to the general welfare as 
to be sanctioned under the police power, and the injury is one' 
that would give rise to a cause of action by the owner inde-
pendently of the constitutional provisions. 
[4] ld.-Compensation - Damnum Absque lnjuria.-Const; 'art. 
I, § 14, which permits an action against the state to recover 
damages for the taking of private property for public use, is ' 
designed merely to give a remedy for a cause of action that 
[2] See 5 Cal. Jur. 696; 11 Am. Jur. 1003. 
[3] See 10 Cal. Jur. 283, 295, 328; 18 Am. Jur. 751. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Dismissal, Discontinuance and Non-
suit, § 75; [2] Constitutional Law, § 97; [3] Eminent Domain, 
§43 (1); [4] Eminent Domain, §47; [5,8-10] Waters, §396; 
[6] Waters, §400; [7] Waters, §393; [11] Waters, §273; [12] 
Waters, §§ 31, 411; [13] Appeal and Error, § 1337. 
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would otherwise exist. The state is not liable under such 
provision for an injury that is damnum absq~te injuria. 
[5] Waters - Surface Waters - Protection Against -'- Confining 
Waters-Improvements in Stream.-A lower owner has no 
right of redress for injury to his land caused by improvements 
made in the stream for the purpose of draining and protecting 
the land above, even though the channel is inadequate to 
accommodate the increased flow of water resulting from the 
improvements. '. . 
[6] Id.-Surface Waters-Protection Against-Public Improve-. 
ments - Drainage of Surface Waters.-Where a city, a county 
and a flood control district, acting independently, straightened, 
widened and deepened a creek and its tributaries which con-
stituted the natural outlet for surface \vaters, and constructed 
concrete storm drains in the draina~:e area, they were under 
no duty to improve a lagoon into \vhich the creek emptied. 
Such agencies cannot be held negligent for doing v{hat they 
had a right to do, even though a different plan might have 
avoided damage to property along the lagoon when the ,Yaters, 
because of an inadequate outlet, flooded such property. 
[7] Id. - Surface Waters - Protection Against - Discharging 
Water on to Neighboring Land-Diversion Out of Natural 
Channel.:..-Drainage improvements must follow the natural 
drainage of the country. If water is diverted out of its nat-
ural channel and discharged into a diiferent channel or upon 
neighboring land, the diverter is liable to the owner whose 
land is injured by such discharge. 
[8] Id.-Surface Waters-Protection Against-Confining Waters 
- Improvements in Stream - As Diver8ion. - Straightening, 
widening or deepening the channel of a stream to improve 
drainage entails 110 diversion of the wateI'S therein. 
[9] Id.-Surface Waters-Protecti011 Against-Confining Waters 
-Discharge into Inadequate Channel as Diversion.-rrherc is 
no diversion of surface waters if such waters, flowing in no 
defined channel, are for a reasonable purpose gathered to-
gether and discharged into the stream that is their natural 
means of drainage, even though the stream channel is inade-
quate to accommodate the increased flow. 
[10] Id.-Surface Waters-Protection Against-Confining Waters 
-Discharge into Stream-Natural Drainage.-vVhile a land-
owner may not collect surface waters and discharge them 
upon adjacent land, he may discharge them for a reasonable 
purpose into a stream into which they naturally drain without 
incurring liability for damage to the lower land caused by the 
increased flow of the stream. 
(" 
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[11] Id.-Interference of Third Parties-Obstructions-Darilage! 
Any damage caused by an obstruction to thenaturalflo~ 
of waters is actionable. 
[12] Id.-Surface Waters - Actions - Evidence - Cause of In-
juries: Ownership of Land-Protection Against Avulsion.-
A landowner cannot recover damages for flooding: by reason 
of an obstruction in a lagoon created by a bridge constructed 
by public bodies which allegedly caught debris,where plain-
tiff's own testimony showed that the flooding was, caused by 
the inadequacy of the outlet and that it could have occurred 
regardless of any obstruction created by the bridge. Nor ,can 
liability be imposed merely because the bridge bulkheads 
might have prevented the water from widening the channel 
by washing away the banks, since a riparian may erect struc-
tures along the banks of a stream to protect h~s' lands. 
[13] Appeal-Review-Successive Appeals-Questions Concluded 
-Sufficiency of Pleadings-Effect on Nonsuit.-A determina-
tion on appeal as to the sufficiency of a complaint to state 
a cause of action does not on a subsequent appeal require the 
reversal of a judgment of nonsuit where the evidence does not 
sustain the cause of action alleged. . 
APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Frank G. Swain, Judge. Affirmed. 
Consolidated' actions for damages for flooding of plaintiffs' 
lands predicated upon negligence in constructing a drainage 
system with an inadequate outlet, etc .. Judgments of nonsuit 
for defendants affirmed. 
Dempster & Dempster, Grace Dempster, J. H. Creighton 
and Jerrell Babb for Appellants. 
Hibbard & Kleindienst, Hill, .l\1:organ & Bledsoe, Charles 
P. McCarthy, Julius V. Patrosso, Earle M. Daniels, Bartlett 
& Kearney, Harry J. McClean, Irsreld & Irsfeld, Latham & 
Watkins, Freston & li-'iles, Chase, Barnes & Chase and Henry 
M. Lee, as Amici Curiae, on behalf of Appellants. 
E,verett W. Mattoon and J. H. 0 'Connor, County Counsel, 
S. V. O. Prichard, Assistant County Counsel, J. H. Moroney, 
Deputy County Counsel, Ray L. Chesebro, City Attorney, 
[12] See 25 Cal. Jur. 1051; 27 R. C. L; 1139; 
'i: 
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Frederick von Schrader and Leon T. David, Assistants City 
Attorney, and Howard E. Crandall and Henry C. Ramsey, 
Deputies City Attorney, for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiffs own land in Venice, a suburb of 
the city of Los Angeles. The land is located near La Ballona 
Lagoon, a body of water about two miles long and two miles 
wide, which empties into the Pacific Ocean and is fed by 
La Ballona Creek, a natural watercourse draining an area 
of about 134 square miles. A map of the area as it existed 
in 1893 shows that the waters descending from the hills fol-
lowed no defined course until they reached lower La Bal10na 
Creek. In the ensuing years, however, the area drained by 
the creek and its tributaries was transformed into residential 
a.nd business districts and the waters were gradually confined 
to ditches and channels emptying into the creek. The city 
of Los Angeles, the Los Angeles County Flood Control Dis-
t.rict, and the county of Los Angeles, acting independently, 
straightened, widened, and deepened the creek and its tribu-
taries and constructed concrete storm drains to improve the 
drainage. The urbanization of the area resulted in less ab-
sorption of water into the earth, while the improved drainage 
accelerated the flow of water into the lagoon. The outlet 
from the lagoon into the ocean, however, was in no way 
improved to accommodate the increased flow of water but re-
mained in its natural state. Meanwhile several bridges were 
constructed across the lagoon. 
Throughout D€'cember 31, 1933, and January 1, 1934, a 
heavy rainstorm occurred. The waters swept down La Bal-
lona Creek and into the lagoon where, because of the inade-
quate outlet, they overflowed on to plaintiffs' properties, 
flooding them to a depth of from six to eight feet for about 
four days. 
The plaintiffs thereupon brought these actions for damages 
against the city, the county, and the flood control district. 
They claim the right to recover from defendants under article 
I, section 14 of the California Constitution which requires the 
payment of just compensation for private property taken or 
damaged for public use. The complaints allege that defend-
ants acted negligently in constructing a drainage system with 
an inadequate outlet, improperly permitted obstructions in 
the lagoon, diverted water from streets within the drainage 
~ 
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area on to plaintiffs' properties, and damaged plaintiffs' 
property for a public use without making compensation. 
A demurrer of the defendant flood control district to one 
of the complaints was sustained without leave to amend, but 
on appeal the District Court of Appeal reversed the judg-
ment, holding that the complaint stated a good cause of 
action. (Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 15 Cal. App. (2d) 
520 [59 Pac. (2d) 605].) The actioI1;s were then consolidated 
for trial. A.t the conclusion of plaintiffs' evidence, the trial 
court entered judgments of nonsuit in favor of defendants, 
and plaintiffs have appealed. 
[1] It is settled that" A nonsuit should be granted only 
when, accepting the full force of the evidence adduced, to-
gether with every reasonable inference favorable to the 
plaintiff, which may be drawn therefrom, and excluding all 
evidence in conflict therewith, it still appears that the law 
precludes the plaintiff from recovering a judgment. . . ." 
(Mastrangelo v. West Side U. H. School Dist., 2 Cal. (2d) 540, 
544 [42 Pac. (2d) 634]; Angelus Sec. Oorp. v. Ball, 20 Cal. 
App. (2d) 423, 435 [67 Pac. (2d) 152].) Plaintiffs have 
established by their evidence that defendants straightened 
and widened the channel of L'a Ballona Creek and constructed 
concrete storm drains that followed the natural drainage of 
the country; that these improvements accelerated the flow of 
the water; that the outlet into the ocean remained unim-
proved and could not accommodate the increased flow; that 
the defendants had knowledge of the' inadequacy of. the out-
let; that in the opinion of two expe.rts such a drainage system 
was "not good engineering"; and that the flow of water 
was obstructed by several bridges acrq$S the lagoon including 
one constructed by the city. 
. -,) , 
The question presented is whether a governmental agency 
is liable under article I, section 14, for damaging property' 
for a public use when improvements constructed by it along 
the natural course of a stream and its tributaries accelerate 
the flow of the water, and lower lands are flooded because 
of the inadequacy, known to the agency, of the outlet to 
accommodate the increased flow. 
[2] The state or its subdivisions may take or damage pri-
vate property without compensation if such action is essen-
tial to safeguard public health, safety, or morals. (Gray' v. 
.. 
:: 
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Reclamation Dist., 174 Cal. 622 [163 Pac. 1024] at 640;, 
Bowditch v. Boston, ]01 U. S. 16 [25 L. Ed. 980J; Ohicago 
B. £& Q. R. R. Co. v. Ill'inois, 200 U. S. 561 [26 Sup. Ct. 341, 50 
L. Ed. 596J; Omnia Commercial 00. v. United States, 261 
U. S. 502 [43 Sup. Ct. 437, 67 L. Ed. 773] ; see cases cited 
5 Cal. JUl'. 696 et seq.) In certain circumstances, however, 
the taking or damaging of priv9.te property for such a pur-
pose is not prompted by so great a necessity as to be justi-
fied without proper compensation to tile owner. (Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393 [43 Sup. Ct. 158, 67 
L. Ed. 322] ; Chicago B. £& Q. R. R. 00. v. Chicago, 166 U. S: 
~26 [17 Sup. Ct. 581, 41 L. Ed. 979]; see cases cited in 
10 Cal. JUl'. 283, 284, 295.) [3] The liability of the state 
under article I, section 14 of the California Constitution 
arises when the taking or damaging of private property is not 
so essential to the general welfare as to be sanctioned under 
the "police power" (Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra; 
Ohicago B. &Q. R. R. 00. v. Ohicago, supra; 10 Cal. Jur., 
supra; see M'tlgler v. K.ansas, 123 U. S. 623 [8 Sup. Ct. 273, 
31 L. Ed. 205]), and the injury is one that would give rise 
to a cause of action on the part of the owner independently 
of the constitutional provision. (Lamb v. Reclamation Dist;, 
73 Cal. 125, ]29-131 [14 Pac. 625, 2 Am. St. Rep. 775] ; San 
Gabriel Valley Ootmt1'y Olub v. Oottnty of Los Angeles, 182 
Cal. 392 [188 Pac. 554, 9 A. L. R. 1200] ; Jefferson Oounty 
Drainage Dist. v. '.McFaddin, (Tex. Civ. App.) 291 S. W. 322.) 
[4] 'The provision permits an action against the state, which 
cannot be sued without its consent. It is designed, not to 
create new causes of action, but to give a remedy for a cause 
of action that would otherwise exist. The state is therefore 
:not liable under this provision for an injury that is damnum 
absque inj1{'ria. If the property owner would have no cause 
of action were a private person to inflict the damage, he can 
have no claim for compensation from the state. (Lamb v. 
Reclamation Dist., supra, 129-131; San Gabriel Valley 
Oountry Ol'ub v. Oounty of Los Angeles, supra; Jefferson 
Oounty Drainage Dist. v. McFaddin, supra.) In the present 
'case, therefore, plaintiffs have no right to compensation under 
article I, section 14, if the injury is one that a private party 
'would have the right to inflict without incurring liability. 
[5] It is established in California and other jurisdictions 
that a lower owner has no right of redress for injury to 
Nov. 1941.J ARCHER V. CITY OF Los ANGELES. 
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his land caused' by improvements made in',tlie,::,stream,'i'fdr 
the purpose of draining or protecting. the land 'abov'e~\ 'even 
though the channel is inadequate to accommodat'e' ,th~;:i,f­
'creased flow of water resulting from the improvemen\t~'. 
(San Gabriel Valley Country Club v. Count1Fof Los'Angetd, 
S'llpra; Board of Drainage Com'rs. v. Board of Draind,ge 
Com'rs., 130 Miss. 764 [95 So. 75, 28 A. L. R. 1250] ; Mizell 
v. McGowan, 129 N. C. 9,3 [39 S. E. 729, 85Afu. St. Rep. 
705] ; O'Donnell v. City of Syracuse, 184 N. Y.l~t76 N.'E. 
738, 112 Am. St. Rep. 558, 3 L. R. A.(N. S.)1053f; Oity 
of Hamilton v. Ashbrook, 62 Ohio 511 [57N~ E. 2391'; 
Lessenger v. City of Harlan, 184 Iowa 172 [168 N. :W. 803, 
5 A. L. R. 1523] ; Strauss v. Allentown, 215 Pac: 96 '163 Atl.' 
1073, 7 Ann. Cas. 686]; Peck v. Herrington,}09 IlL 611, 
50 Am. Rep. 627] ; Jefferson Oounty Drainag~Dist. v.'Mc-
Faddin, supraj City of Ludlow v. Broaerick, 181 Ky. 
123 [203 S. W. 1082] ; Manteufel v. Wetzel; 133 Wis. 619 
[114 N; W. 91, ]9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 167]; TrilJrJv. Timmer-
man, 90 Wash. 678 [156 Pac. 846, L. R. A. 1916F, 424] ; 
Robb v. Village of La Grange, 158 Ill. 21 [42N. E. 77].) 
In the San Gabriel Valley Country Club case Los Angeles 
County constructed concrete storm drains that followed the 
(' natural drainage of the country, accelerated the flow of 
water, and prevented its absorption by adjoining lands. As 
a result plaintiff's land, situated below the point where the 
drains emptied into the stream, was damaged during a heavy 
rain storm. In holding that plaintiff had no right of re-
covery against the county this court stated (at page 406) ': 
" ... an improvement for the purposes of the drainage and 
'protection of lands above does not give a lower riparian 
'owner on the stream a cause of action merely because such 
improvement increases the volume of water in the stream as 
it comes to his land, even though the burden he is necessarily 
under of protecting his land against the stream is thereby 
increased and his land is injured because of his failure to 
,meet such increased burden; . . . the rule is not subject 
to the limitation that the increased volume must not be such 
,as to make the stream exceed the capacity of its channel." 
[6] Accordingly, the construction of the improvements by 
the defendants in the instant case did not place upon them 
the duty of improving the outlet. They cannot be held negli. 
, gent for doing what they had a right to do even though a 
i' 
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different plan might have avoided the damage. (Board of 
Drainage Oom'rs. v. Board of Drainage Oom'rs., supra, at 
81; Dudley v. Village of Buffalo, 73 Minn. 347 [76 N. W. 
44, 45] ; Hamilton v. Ashbrook, supra, at 241; Lessenger v. 
Oity of Harlan, supra, at 805.) 
[7] The improvements must follow the natural drainage 
of the country. If the water is diverted out of its natural 
channel and discharged into a different channel or upon 
neighboring land, the diverter is liable to the owner whose 
land is injured by such discharge. (Shaw v. Sebastopol, 159 
Cal. 623 [115 Pac. 213] ; Stanford v. San Francisco, 111 Cal. 
198 [43 Pac. 605] ; Farrell v. City of Ontario, 39 Cal. App. 
351 [178 Pac. 740], 36 Cal. App. 754 [173 Pac. 392] ; Dick 
v. City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. App. 724 [168 Pac. 703]; 
M1.llder v. Oity of Los Angeles, 110 Cal. App. 663 [294 Pac. 
485] ; Newman v. City of Alhambra, 179 Cal. 42 [175 Pac. 
414]; see 11 Cal. L. Rev. 444.) [8] In the present case, 
however, there is no evidence of diversion. Straightening, 
widening, or deepening the channel of a stream to improve 
the drainage entails no diversion of the waters therein. (San 
Gabriel Valley Oountry Olub v. County of Los Angeles, 
supra; Lambert v. Alcorn, ]44 Ill. 313 [33 N. E. 53, 21 
L. R. A. 611]; Gentry v. Weaver, 130 Kan. 691 [288 Pac. 
745]; St. Paul &; D. R. Co. v. Duluth, 56 Minn. 494 [58 
N. W. 159, 45 Am. St. Rep. 491, 23 L. R. A. 88] ; Fenton v. 
Adams, 221 Ill. 201 [77 N. E. 531, ] 12 Am. St. Rep. 171] ; 
see 67 C. J. 902.) [9] Likewise there is no diversion if 
surface waters, flowing in no defined channel, are for a rea-
sonable purpose gathered together and discharged into the 
stream that is their natural means of drainage even though 
the stream channel is inadequate to accommodate the in-
creased flow. (San Gabriel Valley Oountry Club v. County 
of Los Angeles supra, 401, 402; Sheehan v. Flynn, 59 Minn. 
436 [61 N. W. 462, 26 L. R. A. 632J; Board of Drainage 
Com'rs. v. Board of Drainage Oom'rs., supra; Mizell v. Mc-
Gowan, supra; Dudley v. Village of Buffalo, supra; Waffie v. 
New York Central R. R. Co., 53 N. Y. 11 [13 Am. Rep. 467J ; 
St. Paul &; D. R. 00. v. Duluth, supra; Oity of Hamilton v. 
Ashbrook, supra; Lessenger v. City of Harlan, supra; Peck 
v. Herrington, supra; Jefferson Oounty Drainage Dist. v. 
McFaddin, supra; Manteufel v. vVetzel, supra; see Robb v. 
Village of La Grange, supra; O'Donnell v. Oity of Syracuse, 
Nov. 1941.] ARCHER V. CITY OF Los ANGELES.' 27' 
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supra; Oity of Maysm1le v. Brooks, 145 Ky. 526 [140 S. W. 
665]; see cases cited in 85 Am. St. Rep. 733, 734.) [10] 
A California landowner may not collect stich waters and dis-
charge them upon adjacent land (LeBrun v. Richards, 210 
Cal. 308 [291 Pac. 825, 72 A. L. R. 336]), but he may dis-
charge them for a reasonable purpose into the stream into 
which they naturally drain without incurring liability for 
damage to lower land caused by the increased flow of the 
stream. As stated in San Gabriel Valley Oountry Olub v. 
County of Los Angeles, supra, at pages 401, 402: "Not 'to 
permit an upper land owner to protect his land against the 
stream would be in many instances to destroy the possibility 
of making the land available for improvement or settlement ' 
and condemn it to sterility and vacancy. Such a rule would 
seriously interfere with the development of' the country. 
Because of this, and because of the necessity of permitting 
the utilization for drainage of the means afforded by nature 
for the purpose, a very great preponderance of the decisions 
In other states go further than it is necessary to go in this 
case, and hold that a riparian owner has no right to complain 
because the volume of water in the :stream is increased by 
artificially draining surface waters into it above, provided 
~ only the stream is the natural drainage channel for the 
lands so drained. Furthermore, this rule is adopted regard-
less of whether the so-called common-law rule concerning 
surface waters prevails in the particular jurisdiction or, as 
here, the civil-law rule, which forbids the gathering together 
of surface waters and discharging them as a stream upon 
adjoining lands. If the surface waters are gathered and 
discharged into the stream which is their natural means of 
drainage, so that they come to the land below only as a part 
of the stream, it is held that no action lies because of their 
being added. (Citing cases.) Mr. Freeman in his note in 
85 Am. St. Rep. 727, reviews very thoroughly the authorities 
dealing with the right to accelerate or diminish the flow of' 
water, and ,upon the particular point under discussion' says " 
(page 733): 'We have just noticed the difference between' 
merely draining on to another's land, and draihing into' a: 
natural channel or watercourse, which flows across8uch'land; 
So far as streams or natural watercourses are concerned, ' 
there can be no doubt that one can drain into them, and, 
thereby increase their volume without subjecting himself to 
i 
I 
i' 
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liability for any damage suffered by a lower owner.'" The 
evidence here presented shows clearly that the storm drains 
constructed by defendants either followed the channel of 
natural streams (see Larrabee v. Cloverdale, 131 Cal. 96, 100 
[63 Pac. 143]), or discharged into the creek surface waters 
that would naturally drain into it. 
[11] Any damage caused by an obstruction to the natural 
flow of waters is also actionable (Richardson v. City of 
Eureka, 96 Cal. 443 [31 Pac. 458]; Dick v. City of Los 
Angeles, supra; Los Angeles Cemetery Ass'n v. Los Angeles, 
103 Cal. 461 [37 Pac. 375] ; Conniff v. San Francisco. 67 Cal. 
45 [7 Pac. 41] ; Larrabee v. Cloverdale, supra; Geurki'Y!k v. 
City of Petaluma, 112 Cal. 306 [44 Pac. 570]), and plaintiffs 
contend that several bridges and other structures obstructed 
the flow of waters through the lagoon. [12] Their evi-
dence shows that only one bridge was constructed by de-
fendants. The basis of liability must therefore depend upon 
this bridge. Plaintiffs' evidence establishes that this bridge 
caught debris swept down into the lagoon and obstructed to ' 
some extent the flow of the waters. The testimony of plain-
tiffs' own experts makes it clear, however, that the flooding 
of plaintiffs' land was caused by the inadequacy of the 
outlet and would have occurred regardless of the obstruc-
tion created by the bridge. Plaintiffs have made no show-
ing that the obstruction of the bridge contributed to the 
damage caused by the overflow. No liability can be imposed 
upon defendants merely because the bulkheads supporting 
the banks on either side of the bridge might have prevented, 
the water from forcibly widening the channel by washing 
away the banks; for it is firmly established that a riparian 
owner may erect bulkheads or other structures along the 
banks of a stream to protect his land from being washed 
away. (Barnes v. Marshall, 68 Cal. 569 [10 Pac. 115]; Wein-
berg Co. v. Bixby, 185 Cal. 87 [196 Pac. 25]; Horton v. 
Goodenough, 184 Cal. 451 [194 Pac. 34] ; De Baker v. South-
ern Cal. Ry. Co., 106 Cal. 257, 279, 280 [39 Pac. 610, 46 Am. 
St. Rep. 237] ; Lamb v. Reclamation Dist., 73 Cal. 125 [14 
Pac. 625, 2 Am. St. Rep. 775] ; Sanguinetti v. Pock, 136 Cal. 
466 [69 Pac. 98, 89 Am. St. Rep. 169]; see cases cited in 
25 Cal. Jur. 1051, 1052, sec. 47; 26 Cal. Jur. 290-292, secs. 
503-508.) The evidence presented by the plaintiffs in the 
~ 
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instant case is therefore insufficient to establish a right to 
recover against the defendants. 
[13] Plaintiffs contend that the decision of the District 
Court of Appeal, holding that their complaint stated a good 
cause of action against a general demurrer, is the ,law of 
the case and requires this court to reverse the . nonsuit of 
the trial court. The District Court of Appeal stated that 
," The gist of the. . . complaint . . . is that respondent 
constructed and built an artificial drainage system. so de-
fectively, carelessly and negligently that it would. not carry 
the storm waters to the Pacific Ocean as 'designed and. in-
tended" and "that the injury to the appellantsoccurredhy 
reason of the fact that respondent. negligently turned'the 
storm waters into La Ballona lagoon, which :'Yastoo small 
to conduct the water turned into it by and; through ,the 
drainage system constructed, operated and ,'maIntained: ,by 
respondent. . . . "According to the' allegatibns"o:f the' coni:. 
plaint, the damage resulted because defendants negligently 
diverted water out of its natural chartnel,and' obstructed 
the channel of the creek. Plaintiffs' 'evidence; however, falls 
to substantiate such allegations. The decision 'of' the Dis. 
trict Court of Appeal on demurrer is therefore not binding 
on this court in passing on the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the allegations. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The statement of facts in these cases contained in the ma-
jority opinion is both incomplete and inaccurate and the legal 
theory, upon which the decision is based is manifestly u:n-
sound and unsupported by respectable authority. 'The prin-
ciples of law, if they may be called such, announced in the 
majority opinion, are clearly contrary to the settled law of 
California and the weight of authority elsewhere. 
Since a correct statement of the facts is essential to the 
proper determination of every law suit, I will first set forth 
the facts as they appear in the record before us in these 
cases. 
Consolidated actions were brought to recover damages re-
sulting from the overflow of storm waters upon the real prop-
.. 
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erty of the plaintiffs and their assignors located in Venice, 
a suburb of the city of Los Angeles. At the close of plain-
tiffs' evidence, judgments of nonsuit were entered from 
which the plaintiffs have. appealed. 
The litigation concerns the drainage area of La Ballona 
Creek, approximately twelve miles square, located in the 
westerly part of Los Angeles County, and is bounded on the 
north by the Santa Monica l\10untains and the Hollywood 
Hills, on the south by the Baldwin Hills, on the east by 
Vermont Avenue and on the west by Sepulveda Canyon and 
the Pacific Ocean. Within the above-mentioned area are 
situated the towns of Culver City, Beverly Hills and Palms, 
and a portion of the defendant city of Los Angeles. The 
entire area is a· part of the defendant Los Angeles County 
Flood Control District. 
It was agreed in the court below that the issue of lia-
bility or nonliability should be tried first. The evidence 
regarding the development and urbanization of the area, 
including changes in the methods of drainage, is voluminous 
and technical. Briefly, when the watershed was in its 
natural state much of the rain that fell into it never reached 
the outlet at La Ballona Lagoon, a large submerged area 
close to the Pacific Ocean which constituted its outlet. The 
. drainage of the watershed extended over a wide area in 
"thin sheets," and much of the water was absorbed in the 
ground, lost by evaporation, or held by large lakes or swamps 
and slow-moving streams. The development of the area 
brought a gradual confinement of the drainage, and sections 
which had once been absorptive, came to have a run-off them-
selves. The defendant city constructed thirteen concrete 
storm drains, the defendant county three. These drains col-
lected the surface waters. rrhe defendant flood control dis-
trict built its structures in the middle reaches of La Ballona 
Creek to deepen, widen and straighten the channel, and 
constructed levees along the banks to confine the water to the 
channel of the creek. These improvements followed the for-
mer natural watercourse and entailed no diversion of water 
from without the watershed. They caused the water to run 
off faster from the drainage area and increased the volume 
flowing into La Ballona Lagoon, the main outlet into the 
ocean. The surface water collected by the storm drains· 
emptied into a large basin where the improvements ended 
•• 
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some three miles east of the lagoon. The water in the basin 
entered the lagoon at two places and flowed through it to 
the only outlet into the ocean. . 
It is the contention of the plaintiffs that "by said opera-
tion and the inadequate outlet into the ocean a 'cul de sac' 
was formed," which had the effect of impounding the storm 
wa tel'S and causing them to overflow the banks of said lagoon. 
On December 31, 1933, and January 1, 1934, a heavy rain 
occurred and the storm waters went down La Ballona Creek 
. and into the lagoon where they overflowed and flooded to a 
depth of six to eight feet for about four days the properties 
of the' plaintiffs and their assignors located some three miles 
north of the lagoon or main outlet into the ocean, which prop-
erties were not riparian to the lagoon or La Ballona Creek. 
These actions for damages followed, and each complaint 
alleges five causes of action. The first cause alleges that the 
defendants were negligent in constructing and maintaining 
an "artificial" drainage system of insufficient size in that 
the lagoon outlet was inadequate to carry and discharge into 
the ocean the concentrated and accelerated flow of water 
which resulted from the high-speed impervious concrete storm 
drains installed by defendants. The second cause alleges 
that while the improvement of the drainage area was for a 
public use and purpose no compensation was made to the 
plaintiffs and their assignors for the damage thereby caused 
to their property. The third cause alleges that the defend-
ants disregarded plaintiffs' rights by constructing a drainage 
system which caused more storm or surface water to be car-
ried into La Ballona Lagoon than it could carry, and by 
failing to remove such obstructions in. the lagoon as bridges 
and an oil derrick. The fourth cause alleges that the de-
fendants have by means of the concrete storm drains and 
conduits" diverted" water from the streets within the drain-
age area to the plaintiffs' property in increasing quantities 
and with destructive force. The fifth cause alleges that the 
defendants have caused and permitted obstructions in and 
across the lagoon outlet without taking the necessary precau-
tions against the overflow of storm waters flowing therein. 
. Prior to the consolidation of these two actions for trial, 
a demurrer of the defendant flood control district to the 
first, fourth and fifth causes of action was sustained without 
/ 
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leave to amend in the Archer case. Upon appeal it was 
stated, in part, by the District Court of Appeal that "The 
gist of [the] ... complaint ... is that respondent con-
structed and built an artificial drainage system so defectively, 
carelessly and negligently that it would not carry the storm 
waters to the Pacific Ocean as designed and intended" and 
"that the injury to the appellants occurred by reason of the 
fact that respondent negligently turned the storm waters into 
La Ballona lagoon, which was too small to conduct the water 
turned into it by and through the drainage system con-
structed, operated and maintained by respondent. . . , " 
The District Court of Appeal thereupon reversed the judg-
ment entered upon the sustaining of the demurrer without 
leave to amend, concluding that the complaint adequately 
alleged causes of action in the respects mentioned. (Archer 
v. City of Los Angeles, 15 Cal. App. (2d) 520 [59 Pac. (2d) 
605].) This is of significance upon this appeal since the 
motion for nonsuit made (and here granted) at the close of 
the plaintiffs' case operates as a demurrer to the evidence. 
(See cases cited in 9 Cal. Jur. 551, sec. 35.) If, as held by 
the District Court of Appeal, the complaint in the Archer 
case (identical with that in the Allison case) states causes 
of action for damages based on the negligent or defective 
construction of public works, and the evidence thereafter 
adduced by the plaintiffs tends to establish the allegations 
of the complaints, the trial court must be held to have erred 
in nonsuiting the plaintiffs. I t is settled that "A nonsuit 
should be granted only when, accepting the full force of the 
evidence adduced, together with every reasonable inference 
' favorable to the plaintiff, which may be drawn therefrom, 
and excluding all evidence in conflict therewith, it still ap-
pears that the law precludes the plaintiff from recovering a 
judgment under such circumstances." (Mastrangelo', v. 
West Side U. H. School Dist., 2 Cal. (2d) 540, 5'44 [42 Pac. 
(2d) 634]; Angelus Sec. Corp. v. Ball, 20 Cal. App. (2d) 
423, 436 [67 Pac. (2d) 152, 158].) 
The witness Frisbie, a civil engineer, who had been familiar 
with the La Ballona drainage area for approximately eighteen 
years, described its natural state and subsequent develo'p-
mente He pointed out that engineers employ two principal 
methods to control flood waters: to retard and hold them 
back in storage reservoirs, or to confine the -waters,that 
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natttrally flow over porous soils to line channels at high speed 
so that more water will flow to the outlet at given times. He 
added that the problem in the latter method, which he stated 
'Was employed by the defendants to drain the La Ballona 
watershed, is the outlet. He testified that the effect of the 
concrete storm drains and the straightening and widening of 
the La Ballona channel to concentrate the run-off, was not 
only to accelerate the flow but to cause more water to flow 
down because it was no longer in part lost in absorption 
or evaporation. "To discharge that water through these 
high-speed drains, concentrate, and discharge it right out 
into open space, with no control over it, and then a thoroughly 
bottled up outlet, in my opinion, would be very bad en-
gineering .... The capacities of the outlets into, the lagoon 
between the sand bar and the sand dunes, in the condition 
in which they were during that period, were insufficient 
to carry off the water, to carry the water away as fast as' 
it was arriving." He gave a negative answer to the question 
whether it was "good engineering to construct an elaborate 
system of storm drains in the upper part of,theLaBallona 
Creek watershed, and for the Los Angeles County' Flood 
It Control District to construct a fine, high-speed.m8;ih~hahnel 
, down to and beyond Centinela Boulevard,'and"then turn 
the storm water loose at that point 'with 'suchi'faMlities "as 
existed for its escape in to La Ballona 'Lagoon,' 'aeF e:dst:ed ;;()n 
December 31, 1933." As reasons therefor he,'a:aded(" Be-
cause the construction of all these ,high-speed ;dra:his and 
the great areas of impervious surfaces :greatlyiricreased :the 
quantity of storm waters that would arrive doWn in that 
'area at a given time, and would require good~ ariipl~-facilities 
for an outlet capacity far greater than it required under 
the natural conditions of that watershed,"when'a'greatdeal 
of that water never got there, because it 'was 'a:bsorb'e'd>intne 
'debris cones and absorbed in the brush' arid 'ailikind~!:!of 
growth, and when it approached at, very 'slow ' veld~ities 
through these cienagas and over the natural sU'rface2-to turn 
that loose at that point with no open,'flaf'couhtry and''ilO 
possible way to force that water through' a:: limited outlet 
without piling the water up several feet deep, in rfty opInion, 
was not good engineering." ;'l 
The witness Bell, a consulting civil engineer, whd;'maiiy 
years earlier had done some work for the defendant flood 
19 C. (2d)-2 
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control district and the defendant county in connection with 
La Ballona Creek, described the area in its natural and sub-
sequently altered state much as did the witness Frisbie. He, 
too, testified that it was not "good engineering to construct 
an elaborate system of storm drai:'J.s in the upper part of 
La Ballona watershed, and for the I.1oS Angeles County Flood 
Control District to construct a fine, high-speed main channel 
down to and beyond Centinela bridge ... and then turn 
the storm waters loose at the point with such facilities as 
existed for its escape into La Ballona Lagoon, as existed on 
December 31, 1933 . . . because if there were no facilities for 
the escape of that water when it got down to the estuary of 
La Ballona, there was created what you might call practically 
a cul de sac. It could not get out. It was bound to collect 
like a reservoir and spread out all over the country; nothing 
to prevent it." 
A series of letters, placed in evidence by the plaintiffs as 
exhibits, definitely indicate that the appropriate officers of 
the three defendant entities had knowledge for several years 
'prior to the flood here involved of the imperative necessity 
for a change in the La Ballona outlet to the ocean. On J an-
uary 6, 1931, the chief engineer of the defendant flood con-
trol district addressed a letter to the board of supervisors 
of the defendant county wherein he stated that in the 
previous month he had received a letter from the Venice 
Chamber of Commerce requesting the ' 'construction of a 
dyke to protect Venice from flood waters." In his letter the 
chief engineer pointed out to the board that "The natural 
rate of flow of La Ballona Creek has been greatly increased 
due to the discharge into it of six (16 in 1933) storm dra'tns 
of which four are Los Angeles Oity, one Oulver City and 
one County Drain. The Flood Control District has during 
the past summer enlarged and cleaned the entire channel 
where rights of way were obtained. Lacking an adequate 
outlet to the ocean the channel capacity has each year been 
barely sufficient to handle the relatively low flows that have 
occurred and in the event of a major or even a moderate 
flood two principal locations would be subject to damage. 
1. The City of Venice. 2. Culver City and vicinity. . . . " 
In an earlier letter (1930)' to the board of supervisors in 
which the chief engineer discussed the drainage changes that 
had been made in the area and of the then existence of five 
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storm drains (county and city) and' of the,' prop()sal of i the 
city to construct five additional drains,he'added "to; fully" 
relieve the present situation an outlet 'to the 'ocean is ~esseri-
tial. " ' ':~, '; 
It is manifest that the foregoing facts: are '\stifficient'to 
make a prima facie case in accordance'with plairitiffs" allega-
tions and to establish what the District Coui-f'ot ,cAppeal 
declared to be the gist of the Archer action~ that:Is/ that 
"The gist of [the] . . . complaint . ~ . is that ;respondeJ?,t 
constructed and built an artificial drainage system 'so de-
fectively, carelessly and negligently that it would not 'carry 
the storm waters to the Pacific Ocean as designed :and in-
tended" and "that the injury occurred by reason of the fact 
that respondent negligently turned the storni~aters into 
La Ballona Lagoon, which was too small to conduct the water 
turned into it by and through' the drainage system con-
structed, operated and maintained by respondent. . . . ", 
(Archer v. City of Los Angeles, supra.) On the doctrine of 
the law of the case, as to the Archer case, and stare' decisis, 
as to the Allison case, it must be held that plaintiffs have 
established the liability of defendants. 
"'. The attempted answer to that incontrovertible proposition 
ai, advanced by the majority opinion is that: "According to the 
allegations of the complaint, the damage resulted because 
defendants negligently diverted water out of its natural 
channel, and obstructed the channel of the creek. Plaintiffs 
evidence, however, fails to substantiate such allegations." 
That statement is palpably incorrect. The gist of the action 
as stated by the District Court of Appeal was not that water 
had been "diverted out of its natural. channel," rather it 
was that the defendants negligently" turned the storm waters 
into La Ballona Lagoon," that is, collected surface waters 
and discharged them into the lagoon. The evidence without 
contradiction shows that that occurred. The storm waters 
were collected into drains and turned into the lagoon and 
creek, the outlet of which was too small to carry' them, with 
the result that plaintiffs' lands were flooded when the lagoon 
overflowed. The prior decision is therefore the 'law of the 
case and controlling here. 
The true basis of liability in cases of this character is 
found in the constitutional provision prohibiting the taking 
or damaging of property for a publi~ use without the pay., 
i 
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ment of just compensation. (California Constitution, art. I, 
sec. 14.) The liability exists independent of negligence on 
the part of the public agency. (Tormey v. Anderson-Ootton-
U'ood Irr. Dist., 53 Cal. App. 559 [200 Pac. 814] ; Elliott v. 
County of Los Angeles, 183 Cal. 472 [191 Pac. 899] ; Kauf-
man v. Tomich, 208 Cal. 19 [280 Pac. 130].) In the instant 
case the evidence shows that the defendants launched and 
constructed an extensive public improvement, to-wit: The 
drainage of the area above-mentioned into the Pacific Ocean. 
It establishes that the improvement was inherently improper, 
was negligently planned and carried out, and was contrary 
to skillful engineering practices. The drainage of the water 
into the Pacific Ocean could not be accomplished without 
flooding plaintiffs' land with the condition of the outlet from 
La Ballona Lagoon being in the condition in which it existed. 
Further, the evidence shows that defendants knew of that 
condition. It cannot be said that the object and design of 
the drainage system did not include the discharge of the 
drainage water into the ocean. That discharge was neces-
sarily an inseparable part of the entire drainage scheme. 
Defendants were obligated therefore either properly to im-
prove the outlet or to compensate anyone whose property was 
damaged by reason of the insufficiency of the improvement. 
They knew that the improvement would result in the flooding 
of property; that flooding was a necessary and component 
part of the entire system, and as they failed to acquire by 
eminent domain the right to so flood the property, then they 
must now compensate the owners thereof for the injury 
thereby caused. In essence the situation is no different than 
if defendants had constructed an outlet from the lagoon to 
the ocean which was too small to carry the water and a flood 
resulted. They adopted the natural outlet known to be 
insufficient in size as a part and parcel of the improvement, 
the drainage system. The case is not essentially different 
from Kaufman v. Tomich, supra. There the improvemen1 
consisted of a sewer line in a street. While the sewer ditch 
was open, plaintiff's property, lying adjacent to the street, 
was damaged by the shifting of the soil upon which rested 
the foundation of hJr building. This court in affirming a 
judgment for plaintiff stated at page 21: 
" ... that if the act commanded by the municipality was 
inherently wrong, then both the municipality and the agent 
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performing the work would be answerable in damages to any-
one injured thereby, even in the absence of negligence in its 
performance. This declaration finds support in Perkins v. 
Bla'ldh, 163 Cal. 782, 789 (127 Pac. 50, 53), wherein the rule· 
is expressed in the following language: ' Upon the other hand, . 
if the act is one commanded by the municipality' itself, if· 
inherently wrong, tho municipality and the agent who per-
formed will both be liable. . . . If the injury· results, how- ' 
ever, not from the wrongful plan or character of the work, 
but from the nogli~ent or improper manner in which it is 
performed, the one so negligently acting will always be re-
sponsihle, and the public corporation mayor may not be 
responsihle, depending- upon the relationship which it may 
sustain to that agent.' Being satisfied that the trial court, 
on competent evidence, has found the plan and location of the 
sewer to bo inherently wrong and dangerous, Judge Strother 
declared, as his opinion, that judgment was properly entered' 
against both defendants." The trial court had found in the 
Kaufman case that the "location and alignment 'or the said 
sewer were intrinsically dangerous and inherently wrong, and 
were of such a nature and of so close proximity to the front 
'", of plaintiff's property and plaintiff's wall as were likely in 
~. the natura,l course of construction of the said sewer-to dam-
age and injure said . . . property. . . . " (Emphasis 
a,dded.) In the cases at bar the evidence is capable of the 
construction that the drainage system without a proper outlet 
was not only likely but certain to cause the flooding of plain-
tiffs' land and the defendants knew that result would :follow .. 
Reference may be made to the language in Oonniff v. San 
Francisco, 67 Cal. 45, 50 [7 Pac. 41], involving the flooding 
of plaintiff's land by the construction of 'a street: which 
dammed a stream: ; ... I 
"The case before us is not one of mere, consequential dam.;.; 
age which the tand owner must protect himself against,; ~ri.d' 
for which the law affords him no redress; Itisadirecf 
trespass on the property of plaintiff by the' ;constrU'cti6n' 'of1 
a dam which a moment's reflection would have 'made' 'clear.:, 
to anyone, must inevitably in the cours.e of nature hl1lVere.;.t 
8ultedin the permanent overflowing the land'oi'Plaintift 
when the rainy season came, and from which h~' icould'onIyt 
free himself by cutting away a public highway, lfor' iwhlch i 
he might have been proceeded against both by 8.'civil and~ 
.. 
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criminal action." (Emphasis added.) In the instant case, 
not only would a moment's reflection have made it clear to 
anyone that plaintiffs' land would be flooded, but defendants 
actually knew it. In Spangler v. San Francisco, 84 Cal. 12 
[23 Pae. 1091, 18 Am. St. Rep. 158], the eonstruction of a 
street along a stream interfered with the flow therein, and 
defendant provided sewers or storm drains to carry the 
waters thereof to Mission Bay; by reason of disrepair the 
sewer failed to earry the water and plaintiffs' property was 
flooded. This eourt said at page 17: 
"It was the duty of the city, w:1en it does provide water.:. 
ways, to provide s1.u;h as are sufficient to carry off the water 
that might reasonably be expected to accumulate. The rule 
is so laid down in Damour v. Lyons Oity, 44 Iowa, 282; ap-
proved and followed in Powers v. Oity of Oouncil Bluffs, 50 
Iowa, 201,202. (See Mayor of New York v. Bailey, 2 Denio, 
433. ) We think the rule above stated correct, and approve 
it." (Emphasis added.) And at page 19: 
"Dillon states that 'there is a municipal' liability where 
the property of private persons is flooded, either direetly or 
by water being sent back, when this is the result of the negli-
gent execution of the plan adopted for the eonstruction of 
gutters, drains, eulverts, or sewers, or of the negligent failure 
to keep the same in repair and free from obstruetion, and 
this, whether the lots are below the grade of the streets or 
not. The cases support this proposition with great unanim-
ity.' " 
In Stanford v. San Francisco, III Cal. 198 [43 Pae. 605], 
the eonstruction of a street (analogous to the drains in the 
cases at bar) by a city caused the collection of surface water 
which flowed into plaintiff's basement because of insufficient 
drainage facilities. It was held that the city was liable, this 
court stating at page 202: 
, 'Here the grade of Jessie street was not changed, nor is 
there any claim that the premises occupied by plaintiffs were 
below grade. Here a street, which before it was paved 
absorbed the water falling upon it, by the paving is made 
to retain and eollect the same upon its surface, no means 
being provided for removing or conducting it away. The 
portion of the street so paved crossed no street or a,lley by 
which it could be diverted, and as the easterly end was more 
than two feet lower than its westerly end, and was absolutely 
L I ~
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closed at the lower end by a building which cross~d it, it was 
inevitable that the water falling on that portion of the street 
below Fourth street would be collected and retained until it 
could escape by flowing over the curb and sidewalk and into 
the basement occupied by the plaintiffs. . .. . ; . . . ' 
"Counsel for appellant cites section 1039 of :.Dillon 'sMu,-
nicipal Corporations in support of the. proposit~dnithat··'the_ 
law regards surface water as a commoneneniy~',~wHicii every' 
proprietor may fight or get rid of as best heinay~~' ,"t: '<;,':. 
"That section and the two following are devbted'to'the 
subject of 'liability in respect of surface water,' a:nd thehist 
of these (section 1041) is devoted to the question' of'the 
'omission to provide drains.' The learned author says:' It 
is clear that there is no liability on the part' 0'£ ,a municipal 
corporation for not exercising the discretionary or legislative 
powers it may possess to improve streets, and. as part, of such 
improvement, to eonstruct gutters or provide 'other means' 
for draining for surface waters, so as to prevent them from 
flowing upon the adjoining lots.' But in note 2ib' s'aid see-
tion it is said: 'If the necessity for the drainage is oaUsed by 
the city, the doctrine of the text (section 1041) that it is not 
bound to supply the drainage does not apply.' . Even as ap-
~ . . ' 
, plIed to property below the level of the street the same learned 
author says: 'It is possible there may be no middle ground; 
but we are unable to assent to the doctrine that by' ~eason of 
their control over streets, and the power to grade and improve 
them, the corporate authorities have the absolute and uncon-
ditional legal right intentionally to divert the water there-
from, as a mode of protecting the streets, and to discharge 
it by artificial means, in increased quantities and with eol-
lective force and destructiveness, upon the property, perhaps 
improved and occupied, of the adjoining owner.' (Dillon 
on Municipal Corporations, sec. 1042.) In a note to this 
section, in the fourth edition, he says: 'The many eases since 
decided, cited in the notes, have found and defined the 
, , middle ground,' , therein referred to, and adjudged the 
law to be as stated in the text.' 
"In Ashley v. Port Huron, 35 Mich. 296, 35 Am. Rep. 
552, it was held that where a city construeted a sewer in 
such manner as to throw a large quantity of water upon 
plaintiff's premises which otherwise would not have flowed 
there1 it was liable for the damage caused thereby. In the 
.. 
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.QP~nlpn in that case, after referring to a great many 8U-
ithoriiies, . Chief Justice Cooley said: 'I t is very manifest·, 
from this reference to authorities, that they recognize in 
municipal corporations no exemption from responsibility 
where the' injury an individual has received is a direct .in-
jury accomplished by a corporate act which is in the nature 
of a trespass upon him. The right of an individual to the 
occupation and enjoyment of his premises is exclusive, and 
the public authorities have no more liberty to trespass upon 
it than has a private individual. If a corporation send 
people with picks and spades to cut a street through it 
without first acquiring the right of way, it is liable for a 
tort; but it is no Ip.ore liable under such circumstances than 
it is when it pours upon his land a flood of water by a public 
sewer so constructed that the flooding must be a necessary 
result. The one is no more unjustifiable than the other. 
Each is a trespass,: and in each instance the city exceeds 
its lawful jurisdiction. A municipal charter never gives and 
never could give authority to appropriate the freehold of a . 
chizen without compensation, whether it be done through 
an actual taking of its streets or buildings, or by flooding it, 
so as to interfere with the owner's possession. His prop-
erty right is as much appropriated in the one case as in the 
other.' 
"In Seifert v. Brooklyn, 101 N. Y. 136, 142, 54 Am. Rep. 
664, it was said: 'Municipal corporations have quite in-
variably been held liable for damages occasioned by acts 
resulting in the creation of public or private nuisances, or 
for an. unlawful entry upon the premises of another whereby 
injury to his property has been occasioned. (Baltimore etc. 
R. R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U. S. 317 [2 Sup. 
Ct. 719, 27 L. Ed. 739].) This principle has been uniformly 
applied to the act of such corporation in constructing streets, 
. sewers, drains and gutters, whereby the surface wat~r of a 
large territory, which did not naturally flow in that direction, 
was gathered into a body, and thus precipitated upon the 
premises of an individual, occasioning damage thereto. ' (See 
also note to Chalkley v. Richmond, 29 Am. St. Rep. 742, under 
the head' Surface Water,' where a large number of cases 
from many ditferent states are cited.) 
"In Los Angeles Cemetery Assn. v. Los Angeles, 103 Cal. 
461,.,470 [37 Pac. 375], the same principle is asserted; and 
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in the later case of De Baker v. Southern Cal. Ry. Co., 106 
Cal. 257, 282 [39 Pac. 610] 46 Am. St. Rep. 237, it was said: 
'But if the work was inherently and according to its plan 
and location a dangerous obstruction to the river, such as 
ordinary prudence should have guarded against, not only the 
author of the plan to obstruct the stream (the city of I.1oS 
.Angeles), but the person placing the obstruction, was sev-
erally liable for the entire damage.' (See, also, Reardon v. 
San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492 [6 Pac. 317], 5:6 Am. Rep. 109, 
where the city was held liable for an injury to plaintiff's 
lot caused by work done upon the street, which was the im-
mediate, direct and necessary effect of the work done.) 
u Oorcoran v. Benicia, 96 Cal. 1 [30 Pac. 798], 31 Am. St. 
Rep. 171, and the other cases cited by appellant on page 5 
of his brief do not conflict with the authorities which we have 
cited above. Oorcoran v. Benicia, supra, is to the effect that 
a municipal corporation is not liable for damages caused by 
the prevention of the flow of surface water from the lot of 
a private owner, by raising the street to the grade, where 
such water does not run in a natural channel across the 
lot. The distinction between that case and this is obvious, 
and the other cases cited by appellant rest upon similar 
facts. ' , ( Emphasis added.) 
There is no distinction between failure to provide a proper 
sewer to carry off the surface waters collected by the mu-
nicipality, and a failure to provide a proper outlet from 
La Ballona Lagoon. Also there is no distinction between 
the paving of a street which thereby collected surface water 
and discharged it on plaintiff 's land and accomplishing the 
same result by concrete drains. 
It is said in 43 Corpus Juris 1126, in regard to establish-
ment of drainage systems by municipalities: 
"But according to a number of authorities this rule does 
not extend to exempt a municipality from liability for negli-
gence in the adoption of a pIan for drains or sewers, and 
where the municipal authorities negligently adopt or devise 
a plan or system which is obviously defective, or the unfit-
ness of which has been demonstrated by previous experience, 
the municipality is liable for the reSUlting damage. It has 
also been laid down that the rule under discussion is subject 
to the distinction that, where the plan adopted by a mu-
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nicipality must necessarily cause an injury to private prop-
erty, equivalent to some appropriation of the enjoyment 
thereof to which the owner is entitled, then the municipality 
is liable, but where the fault found is with the wisdom of 
the measure or its sufficiency or adaptability to carry out or 
accomplish the purpose intended, and where its construction 
according to the plan adopted invades no private rights, then 
the municipality is not liable." 
Pacific Seaside Home v. N ewbert P. Dist., 190 Cal. 544 
[213 Pac. 967]', is a case precisely in point and squarely 
contrary to the holding of the majority opinion. This court 
said in that case at page 546: 
"The gIst of the plaintiff's complaint is that the defendant 
constructed channels for the water of the Santa Ana River 
so defectively and negligently that they would not carry the 
waters of the. stream. Plaintiff alleges that 'had the defend-
ant not changed the natural course of the Santa Ana River, 
or in anywise interfered with its natural flow, the waters of 
the Santa Ana River :would have flowed on into Newport Bay 
and no damage would have accrued to the plaintiff had the 
said river been permitted to flow as it naturally would had ~ 
not tHe defendant constructed its channel to divert the same. 
... ' It is further alleged in effect that the injury occurred 
to the plaintiff by reason of the fact that the defendant 
negligently turned the waters of the Santa Ana River in a 
. channel which was too small, and which was negligently con-
structed and maintained, and that by reason thereof it was 
damaged. 
"These facts sufficiently state a cause of action. " (Empha-
sis added.) 
In the cases at bar defendants constructed drains, altered 
the channel and interfered with the natural drainage and 
discharged the waters into the lagoon, the outlet of which 
"was too small," all to the damage of plaintiffs. 
Commencing with the premise that the state or an agency 
thereof would not be liable for the flooding of plaintiffs' 
lands, if an individual would not be responsible for the same 
conduct, the majority opinion concludes that defendants are 
not liable because: "It is established in California and other 
jurisdictions that a lower owner has no right of redress for 
InJury to his land caused by improvements made in the 
stream for the purpose of draining or protecting the land 
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above, even though the channel is inadequate to accommo-
date the increased flow of water resulting from the improve-
ments. " (Obviously the statement is directly contrary to 
Pacific Seaside Home v. Newbert P. Dist., supra.) In connec-
tion therewith it is also stated: "Likewise there is no diversion 
if surface waters, flowing in no defined channel, are for a 
reasonable purpose gathered together and discharged into 
the stream that is their natural means of drainage even 
though the stream channel is inadequate to accommodate 
the increased flow. A California landowner may not collect 
such waters and discharge them upon adjacent land ... but 
he may discharge them for a reasonable purpose into the 
stream into which they naturally drain without incurring 
liability for damage to lower land caused by the increased 
flow of the stream." (Emphasis added.) Those propo-
sitions are entirely out of line with the long and firmly 
established law in California with respect to surface waters. 
An upper owner may not collect surface waters in channels 
and thereby cause them to flow upon a lower owner's land 
in increased volume to his damage. This rule has been com-
monly referred to as the civil law rule as distinguished from 
the common law rule. The rule in this state was stated 
many years ago in Oonniff v. San li'rancisco, supra, at page 
49: 
"An individual has no right to collect in artificial chan-
nels mere surface water, and precipitate it upon the land of 
another. Nor has a corporation, whether public or private, 
the right to collect in such channels mere surface water pre-
cipitated by rain or snow over large districts, and throw it 
upon the property of another. The cases to this effect are 
numerous, and may be found cited in a note to section 272 
of Gould on Waters." (See, also, Los Angeles O. Assn. v. 
Los Angeles, 103 Cal. 461 [37 Pac. 375]; Stanford v. San 
Francisco, supraj Rudel v. Los Angeles Oounty, 118 Cal. 
281 [50 Pac. 400] ; Larrabee v. Oloverdale, 131 Cal. 96 [63 
Pac. 143] ; Wood v. Moulton, 146 Cal. 317 [80 Pac. 92] ; Gal-
breath v. Hopkins, 159 Cal. 297, 298 [113 Pac. 174] ; Shaw v. 
Sebastopol, 159 Cal. 623 [115 Pac. 213] ; Heier v. Krull) 160 
Cal. 44] [117 Pac. 530] ; Thomson v. La Petra, 180 Cal. 771 
[183 Pac. 152] ; Le Brun v. Richards, 210 Cal. 308 [291 Pac. 
825, 72 A. L. R. 336] ; Switzer v. Yunt, 5 Cal. App. (2d) 71 
.. 
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[41 Pac~ (2d) 974]; Everett v. Davis, 18 Cal. (2d) 389 
[115 Pac. (2d) 821].) 
Even though the surface waters collected are discharged in 
a natural channel on the upper owner's land, he is liable for 
flooding the land of the lower owner where the cause of the 
flooding is the increase in the volume of the water flowing to 
the lower owner beyond the capacity of the stream. 
The true rule with respect to the drainage of surface 
waters and rights in relation thereto is set forth in Le Brun v. 
Richards, supra, Although the factual situation there was 
not the same as here the rule there announced is applicable 
to a factual situation such as that here involved. It was 
t.here stated: 
'" . . . From these rights and burdens, the principle 
follows that he has a lawful right to complain, of others, 
who, by interfering with natural conditions, cause such sur-
face water'to be discharged in greater quantity or in a differ-
ent manner' upon his land than would occur under natural 
conditions. This is the settled law of this state.' In support 
of the above statement the court cites a long array of earlier ~, 
decisions. On the other hand, a different rule applies in 
the case of flood waters. Such waters are regarded as 'a 
common enemy against which every man has a right to defend 
himself, regardless of the fact that the barriers he erects for 
the protection of his land may cause the flood to rise higher 
or flow with greater force upon his neighbors.' (McDaniel 
v. Cummings, 83 Cal. 515 [8 L. R. A. 575, 23 Pac. 795, 797].) 
This rule has been enunciated and applied in a number of 
cases, among which may be mentioned Lamb v. Reclamation 
Dist., 73 Cal. 125 [2 Am. St. Rep. 775, 14 Pac. 625], Sangui-
:netti v. Pock, 136 Cal. 466 [89 Am. St. Rep. 169, 69 Pac. 98, 
.99], Gray:v. Reclamation Dist., 174 Cal. 622 [163 Pac. 1024], 
!ap.d Hortorvv:- Goodenough, 184 Cal. 455 [194 Pac. 34, 35])' 
:And again: at page 315 : 
g;\ ;" The(upper' proprietor may not divert by· artificial means 
,the surface-waters upon his own lands to the lands of the 
.lower proprietor nor may he accelerate by means of ditches 
or increase the drainage of his own land to the injury of the 
flower owner. 'His right 'is limited to the disposition of the 
'water through the chosen channels of nature.' (Board of 
rTrustees' v.Rodley, supra.)" (Emphasis added.) 
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By the weight of authority the right of an upper owner 
to drain surface water into a watercourse is qualified to the 
extent that the flow must not be increased beyond the capacity 
of the stream; the flow of a stream cannot be increased be-
yond its natural capacity as was done here to the injury of 
one's property below by flooding. (Thompson on Real Prop-
erty, Perm. Ed., vol. 2, sec. 663; Ryder v. Town of Lexington, 
303 Mass. 281 [21 N. E. (2d) 382]; North Dakota v. Minne-
sota, 263 U. S. 365 [44 Sup. Ct. 138, 68 L. Ed. 342] ; Jackman 
v. Arlington Mills, 137 Mass. 277; Belcastro v. Norris, 261 
Mass. 174 [158 N. E. 535] ; Smith v. Orben, 119 N. J. Eq. 
291 [182 Atl. 153] ; McCormick v. Horan, 81 N. Y. 86 [37 
Am. Rep. 479] ; Spink v. Corning, 61 App. Div. 84 [70 N. Y. 
Supp. 143] ; note, 28 A. L. R. 1262). And that rule is ap-
plicable where the one doing the draining is a public corpora-
tion. (Sisters of St. Joseph Corp. v. Atlas Gravel & Stone 
Go., 120 Conn. 168 [180 Atl. 303] ; Baldwin v. Ohio Twp., 
70 Kan. 102 [78 Pac. 424, 109 Am. St. Rep. 414, 67 L. R, A. 
642]; Hicks v. Owensboro, 6 Ky. L. Rep. 226; Noonan v. 
Albany, 79 N. Y. 470 [35 Am. Rep. 540]; McCutchen v. 
Peekskill, 167 Misc. 460 [3 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 277] ; Ryder v. 
Town of Lexington, supraj Miller v. City of Woodburn, 134 
Ore. 536 [294 Pac. 349]; McQuillin Mun. Corps., vol. 6, 
secs. 2874, 2878, 2881, 2882, 2885.) 
The obvious result of the conclusion reached in the ma-
jority opinion is that an upper owner may, with absolute 
impunity, gather surface waters on his land in any quantity, 
discharge them into a stream, and thereby flood the land of 
a lower owner even though that lower owner's land is not 
riparian to the stream, is three miles away from the stream, 
and has never been burdened with surface waters in connec-
tion with the stream involved or from the drainage area 
involved. The authorities relied upon by the majority'opinion 
for that shocking proposition are not in point when ap-
plied to a factual situation disclosed by the record in these 
cases. They consist, with a single exception, of cases from 
other jurisdictions. A review of several of them reveals 
their character. The case of Board of Drain. Com'rs. etc. 
v. Board of Drain. Com'rs., 130 Miss. 764 [95 So. 75, 28 
A. L. R. 1250], predicated its holding on the premise that 
an upper riparian owner by virtue of his ownership, may 
collect the surface watE:rs and discharge them into a stream 
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even though a lower riparian owner is injured. That case 
conceded that the weight of authority was to the contrary. 
Furthermore, the conduct involved was not the act of any 
one upper owner which caused the flooding; that result 
followed only because of a similar practice by many owners. 
(See DrainageDist.v. Haverstick, 186 Ark. 374 [53 S. W. 
(2d). 589, 590, 591].) That is not the case here. In City 
of Ham~1ton v. Ashbrook, 62 Ohio St. 511 [57 N. E. 239], 
the .flooqing was, caused· by the breaking of a levee and not 
by. ex~ess.,d~ainage into the stream. ' 
. In Peck y .. Herrington, 109 Ill. 611 [50 Am. Rep. 627]) 
the rigb,t/ 'was limited to the flow of surface waters into 
natural channels. ' In that case the court said: "The natural 
flow of the surface water was not changed. . .." (Empha-
sis added.) In the cases at bar surface water is collected in 
artificial channels and the flow increased. 
The language in Robb v. Village of La Grange, 158 Ill. 21 
[42 N. E. 77], is dictum. 
In O'Donnell v. City of Syracuse, 184 N. Y. 1 [76 N. E. 738, 
112 Am. St. Rep. 558, 6 Ann. Cas. 173, 3 L. R. A. (N. S .. } 
1053], the flooding was caused by an act of God and not tlTh 
discharge of drainage waters. The court stated at page 743: 
"The plaintiff and the other citizens affected by the flood 
were no worse off than they would have been if the creek had 
not been used at all for sewerage purposes, except for the 
incidental deposit of sewage matter." (Emphasis added.) 
Plaintiffs in the cases at bar are undeniably worse off be-
cause of the drainage system. 
Dudley v. Village of Buffalo, 73 Minn. 347, 76 N. W. 44, 
is clearly not in point. There the court stated at page 45: 
"It is clear, then, that the village is not liable for putting 
in the upper drain, and thereby carrying the water across 
the street, because it did not gather the surface water, and 
unnecessarily discharge it in a stream upon the plaintiff's 
premises, where it did not naturally belong." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Waffle v. New York Central R. R. Co., 53 N. Y. 11 [13 Am. 
Rep. 467], is distinguished in a later New York c~se which 
recognizes and applies the rule that an upper riparian owner 
may not collect surface waters and discharge them into a 
stream in excess of its capacity. In Noonan v. City of Al-
bany, 79 N. Y. 470 [35 Am. Rep. 540], the court in limiting 
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the rule. of the Waffle case stated at page 477: "The right 
of a riparian owner to drain the surface-water on his lands 
into a stream which flows through them, and which is its 
natural outlet, is an incident to his right as riparian owner 
to the reasonable use of the stream. But this right is not, 
we conceive, an 8,bsolute right under all circumstances, ir-
respective of the size of ihe stream, or the natural purpose 
which it sub serves, to throw into it surface-water by means 
of ditches or drains, when by so doing it will be filled beyond 
its natural capacity, and overflow and flood the lands of a 
lower proprietor. " (Emphasis added.) This is directly in 
accord with the views herein expressed by me. 
City of Maysville v. Brooks, 145 Ky. 526 [140 S. W. 665], 
does not involve a factual situation in any way analogous 
to the cases at bar. 
In Strauss v. Allentown, 215 Pa. 96 [63 Atl. 1073, 7 Ann. 
Cas. 686], the court applied the" common enemy" rule to 
surface waters. It cannot be doubted that such rule is ap-
plicable only to flood waters in California, and may not be 
applied to surface waters. (26 Cal. Jur. 279-293.) The 
same is true of Jefferson County Drainage Dist. v. McFaddin, 
(Tex. Civ. App.) 291 S. W. 322. City of Ludlow v. Brod-
erick, 181 Ky. 123 [203 S. W. 1082], recognized the limita-
tion on the right to collect and discharge surface waters. 
The court said at page 1083: 
"Finally it is insisted that the smooth surface of the brick 
street has facilitated the flow of the water and allowed it to 
pass freer and faster but in the same course and quantity. 
The rule recognized in this state does not allow a recovery 
by a lower or servient estate for damages where the quantity 
of water is not increased nor caused to flow in a new or 
different course or channel. So long as the volume of the 
'Water remains the same and is confined to its usual and ordi-
nary course there is not actionable wrong in facilitating its 
, flow by cleaning the channel or leveling the surface so as to 
let it pass without obstruction or run rapidly." (Emphasis 
added.) 
The same is true of Manteufel v. Wetzel, 133 Wis. 619, 114 
N. W. 91, the court stating at page 92: 
"In other words, causing surface water to flow in its 
natural direction through a ditch on one's own land instead 
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of over the surface or by percolation as formerly, where no 
new watershed is tapped by said ditch and no addition to the 
former volume of surface water is caused thereby, except the 
mere ,carrying in a ditch what formerly reached the same 
point on' defendant's land over a wider surface by percola-
tion through the soil or by flowing over such wider surface, 
is not, when not negligently done, a wrongful or unlawful 
act. " (Emphasis added.) 
A similar comment applies to Trigg v. Trimmerman, 90 
Wash. 678 [156 Pac. 846, L. R. A. 1916F, 424]. 
A further review of the authorities from other jurisdic-
tions relied upon by the majority opinion would serve no 
useful purpose. Most of them do not stand for the rule for 
which they are cited; many are, on the contrary, in accor-
,dance with the views herein expressed. In any event as 
has heretofore been seen those apparently in point are out 
of line with the weight of authority. 
The only case in California cited in the majority opinion 
for the 'foregoing propositions is San Gabriel Valley Oountry 
Olubv.Oounty of Los Angeles, 182 Cal. 392 [188 Pac. 554, ' 
9 A. L. ~. 1200]. Not only are the facts of that case inac- -' 
curately stated in the majority opinion, but the purported 
holding therein relied upon is dictum and was in no way 
necessary to the decision of that case. In that case the county 
of Los Angeles placed concrete conduits in a natural water-
,course. The watercourse flowed through plaintiff's land 
which' 'was" riparian thereto and was situated about a mile 
below' the: point where'the conduit ended. The conduit ac-
celerated 'the flow of the stream causing erosion where the 
stream flowed; through plaintiff's land. There was not any 
'construction ~ofi'''concrete storm drains" as stated in the 
majority" op'inion; the conduit was placed in and as' a part 
ofa natural 'watercourse. There was no collecting of surface 
u~aters by; the construction of drains and the discharge there-
from of 'water into a natural watercourse, as exists in the 
cases at~ 'bar. There was no evidence of any flooding of 
plaintiff?s land or that the conduit caused water to flow in 
the stre~m in excess of its capacity. This court there saId at 
page 404 : HIt does not appear from the findings in the pres-
ent case whether the plaintiff's land was flooded or not." 
(EmphaSIS added.) It is quite apparent therefore that the 
San Gabriel case is not similar to the cases at bar on its 
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facts, and anything stated therein with respect to gathering 
surface waters and discharging them into a stream followed 
by a flooding of a lower owner's land because the capacity 
of the stream was overtaxed, is nothing but dictum and not 
here controlling. Furthermore, the views so expressed are 
in conflict with the law in this state with respect to surface 
waters, and are in effect discarded by Le Brun v. Richards, 
s'upra, which at a later date expressed the true California 
rule on the subject. 
In addition to the foregoing discussion there are many 
other respects in which the San Gabriel case is not properly 
an authority for the rules enunciated in the majority opinion. 
First, it is said in that case, at page 396: 
"But the whole effect of the drains, so far as increasing 
the volume in the stream is concerned, may be summed up 
by saying that they add no water to that already in the 
channel and that which would coine to it on the way, but 
merely serve to pass such waters more completely and more 
speedily from one point in the channel to another, all entirely 
above the plaintiff's land." (Emphasis added.) 
In the cases at bar the drains do add water to that already 
in the channel by collecting and discharging the surface water 
therein. Second, the court states in the cited case, at page' 
396: ' 
"The plaintiff's land is a mile or more below the lower 
end of the drains, and any impetus the water may have as 
it emerges from the drains must be lost long before reaching 
the plaintiff's land. There is no increase in velocity, in other 
words, except such as is a necessary incident of an increased 
volume. ' , ( Emphasis added.) 
In other words any increased velocity of the flow was lost 
before the stream reached plaintiffs' land. Third, it is stated 
therein that it does not appear "that it (the conduit in the 
watercourse) was cOL,structed in a manner more burdensome 
to the plaintiff than was required for the purpose for which 
it was constructed." In the instant cases the evidence is 
clear that the flooding of plaintiffs' land could have been 
avoided if the outlet to the ocean had been given proper at-
tention. Fourth, the waters involved in the Soo Gabriel case 
were not surface waters; here the waters collected by the 
drains which run into the La Ballona Creek conduit are 
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surface waters which are collected by artificial means, the 
drains, and discharged into La BallonaCreek. The increase 
of ,water so brought about contributed to the flooding. It is 
saId in the San Gabriel case, at page 398: 
"It should also be observed at the outset that the present 
case is not concerned with surface waters. Such waters in 
the legal sense are those which fall on the land by pre-
cipitation from the skies or arise in springs and spread 
over the surface of the ground without being collected into 
a definite, body. (McDaniel v. Oummings, 83 Cal 515 [8 
L. R. A.' 575, 23 Pac. 795] ; 3 Farnham on Waters, sec. 278.) 
As to such waters the rule has been established by numerous 
decisions in this state that a land owner may not gather them 
together on his land by artificial means and discharge them 
on to lower lying land in greater volume or in a different 
manner than they would naturally be discharged. Of this 
character are the following decisions cited on behalf of the 
plaintiff: Conniff v. San Francisco, 67 Cal. 45 [7 Pac. 41] ; 
Stanford v. San Francisco, 111 Cal. 198 [43 Pac. 605] ; Cush-
ing v. Pires, 124 Cal. 663 [57 Pac. 572] ; Galbreath v. Hop-
kins, 159 Cal. 297 [113 Pac. 174] ; Shaw v. Sebastopol, 1:59 
Cal. 623 [115 Pac. 213] ; Heier v. Krull, 160 Cal. 441 [117 
Pac. 530]; Cox v. Odell, 1 Cal. App. 682 [82 Pac. 108f:1; 
Peck v. Peterson, 15 Cal. App. 543 [115 Pac. 327]; and 
Stanford University v. Rodley, 38 Cal. App. 563 [177 Pac. 
175]. But the present case is not concerned with s~~rface 
waters and the foregoing decisions are not in point. The 
waters upon which the drains here in question act have lost 
their character as surface waters before they reach the drains 
and have already been gathered into a deji,nite body flowing 
as a stream in a watercourse. The difference between surface 
waters and those collected and flowing in a watercourse is 
well recognized, and the same rules by no means apply to 
one as to the other." (Emphasis added.) Fifth, in the cases 
at bar the water which caused the damage was collected and 
discharged into La Ballona Lagoon and was thereby caused 
to be discharged or spread over land it had never before 
covered. Plaintiffs' land is three miles from the lagoon. This 
distinction appears from the statement at page 398: 
, 'Likewise, the distinction should be observed at the on t-
set between the present case and such decisions as Rude7 v. 
Los Angeles County, 118 Cal. 281 [50 Pac. 400] ; Larrabee v. 
~, 
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Cloverdale, 131 Cal. 96 [63 Pac. 143] ; Wood v. Moulton, 146 
Cal. 317 [80 Pac. 92], and Humphreys v. Moulton, 1 Cal. 
App. 257 [81 Pac. 1085], which are also cited on behalf of 
the plaintiff. These cases were all concerned with water in 
watercourses and with improvements or changes in drainage. 
So far they resemble the case at bar. But in all of them, 
unlike the present case, the improvement or change did not 
have the effect merely of passing down the water in a stream 
more completely and speedily from one point in its channel 
to another, but of diverting it entirely from its channel and 
discharging it either into a different channel in which it did 
not naturally flow or upon neighboring land where there was 
no channel." (Emphasis added.) Sixth, the plaintiffs' land 
here is not riparian to La Ballona Creek; it is three miles 
away and that creek never crossed it. In 'the San Gabriel 
case the stream whose bed was improved crossed plainti.ff's 
land. For that reason he must assume the burdens as well 
as the benefits of riparian ownership, one of which is that 
certain repairs and improvements may be made in the bed of 
the stream above his land although the result is to his injury. 
In the instant cases the stream never invaded plaintiffs' land 
which is three miles therefrom, and to them the flooding of 
the waters onto their land is the same as a diversion of the 
stream onto their property which is admittedly an unlawful 
trespass. Even if it were conceded that an upper owner may 
with impunity, collect and discharge surface waters into a 
natural watercourse with the result that lower land riparian 
to that stream is flooded, defendants here would still be liable. 
Under such a concession the reason for no liability would be 
that by reason of the riparian character of the lower owner's 
land, his riparian right and land might be said to be s'Llbject 
to a servitude or easement owned by the upper owner, that 
is, the right of the upper owner to use the stream as a drain-
age channel. But in the cases at bar plaintiffs' land is three 
miles from the stream and is not subject to any such servi-
tude. Furthermore, defendants have no property rights to 
which such an easement could be appurtenant. (More is said 
on that subject later herein.) Seventh, the court repeatedly 
points out in the San Gabriel case that there is no claim of 
the insufficiency or impropriety of the drainage system of 
defendant, but in the instant cases it is clear that the system 
was obviously improperly constructed and insufficient be-
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cause no proper outlet was furnished for the discharged 
drainage water. Eighth, this court has recently held (July 
31, 1941) that although it may be that an upper owner may 
collect surface waters and discharge them into a stream flow-
ing through his land (citing the San Gabriel case as author-
ity) he may not in so doing change the nattlral conditions or 
alter the /low in the stream to the damage of the lower owner. 
In Everett v. Davis, supra, at page 61, this court said: 
"The appellants also seek to justify their actions upon the 
ground that the highway ditch was the natural means of 
d1'ainage;,;tha:t all of the water from Estes Wash flowsinto it 
at one point or another, and therefore they were entitled to 
pOn<:,entrate these waters by a channel and bring them to the 
ditch at one point. Of course, one may gather and discharge 
surface waters into a stream which is their natural means 
of: drainage. (San Gabriel V. C. v. Los Angeles, supra.) 
But before the acts complained of in the present case, the 
water naturally dispersed' over the land, and that part of it 
which reached the ditch had ,lost much of its force. After 
the appellants constructed their fences, the waters were sent ~ 
through a, narrow channel in a manner quite different from -
the natural /low. Theretofore only some of these waters had 
flowed into the ditch at different points over a wide area; 
thechanne~ contrived, by the appellants brouuht practically 
alt of the /lo.~ of Estes, Wash to one point with destructive 
xorce., ,Unde,r these ,circumstances the principle relied upon 
by the appellants has no application." (Emphasis added.) 
,'l'h~.;majQrity;,opiI!.ion is squarely contrary to the Everett 
,case~ (: In -ithecasesat bar the waters were gathered in ex-
,cessj:v,e, quantities ~in" the La BaUona Lagoon contrary to 
natural.·,conditions, ,and the inevitable flooding occurred. 
,H:As ,heretofore .stated the majority opinion launches its 
discussion of 7 the San Gabriel case on the premise that if a 
private owner would not be liable for the conduct with which 
the :defendantsare here charged, the public agencies, de-
fendants in; this case, would not be liable, and in the fore-
'going discussion I have accepted that premise, but it will 
not withstand a careful analysis. In fact, even a casual 
scrutiny reveals its fallacy. Defendants here may well be 
liable even though a private upper landowner might not be. 
That rule may be proper as a general proposition, if its 
application is limited. It is not applicable however, unless 
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the state is in the same position as a private individual who 
is not liable although inflicting damage because such damage 
occurs in the proper exercise by him of some property right 
possessed by him. If he is not liable it is because what he 
has done has been in the lawful enjoyment of a property 
right. (See Stewart v. Birchfield, 15 Cal. App. 378 [114 
Pac. 999].) For illustration, if an upper riparian owner 
uses the portion of the water to which he is lawfully entitled, 
the lower owner may well be injured thereby because of an 
insufficiency of water to satisfy all of the needs of both of 
them. The lower owner though damaged, could not recover 
from the upper owner because the latter in making a rea-
sonable use of the water was exercising a legal property 
right. That is the basis for the' rule that there may be i:njurf 
but not liability. As a general rule a person is not liable 
to another for an injury inflicted upon the latter if such' 
injury occurs by reason of the lawful exercise by the former 
of his property right. In the illustration above-mentioned 
it would not be questioned that if someone who had no' rights 
in the stream diverted the same quantity of water, the lower 
owner could hold him liable. The state or public agency 
is in no different category.' When it has no property right 
to be exercised, it cannot escape liability for damaging a 
person's property, although such damage might not be 
actionable if caused by a private individual while lawfully 
exercising a property right. Lacking a property right, there 
are only two bases for a damaging of property by the state, 
namely, the power of eminent domain, where compensation 
must be paid, and the police power. 
Defendants urge that the construction of the improvements 
here involved was a proper exercise of the police power and 
for that reason plaintiffs may not be compensated for the 
damages suffered by them. The majority opinion discusses 
the police power, but then for some unrevealed reason does 
not reach any conclusion with respect to its application to 
the cases at bar. It does not hold that the plaintiffs are 
barred from recovery because the flooding was done under 
the police power. It does state: "In certain circumstances, 
however, the taking or damaging of private property for such 
a purpose is not prompted by so great a necessity as to be 
justified without proper compensation to the owner ... 
The liability of the state under article I, section 14 of the 
.. 
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California Constitution arises when the taking or damaging 
of' private property is not so essential to the general welfare 
as to be sanctioned under" the police power." (Emphasis 
added.) Manifestly, the correct test of whether or not the 
police power has been properly exercised is not and never 
has been the degree of public necessity. To be appropriate 
it must be for the public health, safety, morals, or general 
welfare. If the degree of public necessity be the test then 
the constitutional guarantee of just compensation for prop-
erty taken for a public use is completely and forever abro-
gated. If a legislative body finds that public necessity 
requires the taking of property for highways, for streets, 
for a water supply, for recreational areas, for hospitals, for 
schools or other public buildings, or for a myriad of other 
public purposes, the courts must accept such a finding as con-
clusive. If such a finding is all that is necessary to warrant 
the exercise of the police power, there will be no occasion 
for the state or other public agency ever paying for any pri-
vate property taken or damages for a public improvement. 
Who may say that property for schools, highways, streets, 
etc., is not absolutely necessary for the proper functioning of ~, 
the government Y Indeed, it is an indispensable factor in 
the exercise of the power of eminent domain where compen-
sation is payable, that the public convenience and necessity 
demand the taking or damaging of any private property in-
volved in the public improvement contemplated. Thus, under 
the theory advanced in the majority opinion, in any case that 
the power of eminent domain may be properly exercised, the 
police powe:r could also be invoked with the result that no 
compensation could be recovered. Although it is difficult to 
charter the dividing line between the exercise of the two 
powers, it may. be justifiably said that police power operates 
in the field of regulation, except possibly in some cases of 
public emergency such as a, fire where buildings may be 
destroyed, rather than in the taking or damaging of prop-
erty for some public improvement. A man may be prevented 
under the police power from so using 'or maintaining his 
property that it is detrimental to the public health, safety~ 
lJ:!.orals or general welfare. Regulations may be invoked to 
prohibit such use and maintenance. But where neither his 
property nor its use or maintenance by him has any relation 
to the public good sought to be accomplished or evil to be 
;.'i i' '.',. . 
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remedied, other than that the public desires to use his prop-
erty, he should be compensated for the taking or damaging 
of it if the constitutional guarantee still exists. In the cases 
at bar plaintiffs' use and maintenance of their property have 
no relation to defendants' improvements. The distinction 
between the two powers is discussed, in Lewis, Eminent Do-
main, 3rd ed., vol. 1, sec. 6, p. 13, as follows: 
"Everyone is bound so to use his own property as not 
to interfere with the reasonable use and enjoyment by others 
of their property. For a violation of this duty the law pro-
vides a civil remedy. Besides this obligation, which every 
property owner is under to the owners of neighboring prop-
erty, he is also bound so to use and enjoy his own as not to 
interfere with the general welfare of the community in which 
he lives. It is the enforcement of this last duty which per-
tains to the police power of the State so far as the exercise 
of that power affects private property. Whatever restraints 
the legislature imposes upon the use and enjoyment of prop-
erty within the reason and principle of this duty, the owner 
must submit to, and for any inconvenience or loss which he 
sustains thereby, he is without remedy. It is a regulation, 
and not a taking, an exercise of police power, and not of 
eminent domain. But the moment the legislature passes 
beyond mere regulation, and attempts to deprive the indi-
vidual of his property, or of some substantial interest therein, 
under pretense of regulation, then the act becomes one of 
eminent domain, and is subject to' the obligations and limi-
tations which attend an exercise of that power. We shall 
defer until a subsequent chapter a discussion of the limits 
of the police regulation of private property and of the acts 
which, though under the guise of police regulation, amount to 
a taking of property for public use, and which, therefore, can 
only be accomplished under the"power of eminent domain. It 
is sufficient for the present purpose to point out the distinction 
between the two powers. Under the one, the public welfare 
is prompted by regUlating and restricting the use and en-
joyment of property by the owner; under the other, the pub-
lic welfare is promoted by taking the property from the 
owner and appropriating it to some particular public use." 
(Emphasis added.) 
The majority opinion cites the case of Gray v. ReclamatiolI 
District No. 1500, 174 Cal. 622 [163 Pac. 1024), in support 
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. of the proposition that the state or its subdivisions may take 
or.damage ,private property without compensation if such 
:action is es~ential to safeguard public health, safety or morals. 
,While it,is;.,t:rue that the Gray case holds that the drainage 
.a~d "reclam~tion of lands, apart from any question of the 
nayig~bility: of streams, is a legitimate exercise of the police 
power of the state, itis in no respect an authority for hold-
h;lg that . the ,damages suffered by plaintiffs in the cases at 
,bar, ,call.': b,e,.justified .under the most liberal exercise of the 
'~olicepo'\Ver:t~~t .. ha.sever been asserted by enthusiastic 
.adio~ates. of the . extension of that power. While there is 
much ,dictum in the Gray case which has been seized upon 
byt~os~.des~rin~to extend the application of the police power 
.doctrine into the field of eminent domain, I think it is clear 
that'.whell the Gray case is studied and analyzed, it cannot ,b~said., tp.~C'~heprill:ci:ples of law therein announced in any 
waytrenchupon:or purport to abrogate the provisions of sec:-
,tlon::i(o~\ariicleI of our state Constitution prohibiting the 
,taking .9:r. da~agiIlg -of private property for public use without 
the paYI:llel1t'of just compensation therefor. In the first place, 
the plaintiff. in the Gray case sought to restrain the reclama- ~ 
'tion district, . which was created by a statute passed by the 
legislature ,of this state, from carrying into effect the provi-
sions of such statute which were designed to control the 
flood waters of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers to 
the. end that, the navigability of those rivers would be im-
proved, and lands which were in danger of being flooded 
during the period of run-off each year would be protected 
from injury as the result of such floods, and thousands of 
acres of land within the drainage area of said rivers would 
be reclaimed from a state of inundation and brought into 
,a state of productive use. The injury complained of by 
plaintiff in the Gray case was prospective and temporary 
only and this court expressly stated that plaintiffs could 
protect themselves against it. At page 639 of the opinion 
in said case the court states: 
"In the case at bar it is to be observed that the flooding, 
occasioned only by reason of the diminution of the area of 
the Sutter Basin, will in the first place be but temporary and 
will end when the reclamation works in the Sutter Basin are 
completed, and, in the second place, may be protected against 
by the levee district, in which most of plaintiff's lands are 
[ 
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situated, and by the other property owners by a back levee, 
or by the construction of the eastern levee of the Sutter 
Basin by-pass, for their proportionate expense in building 
which their lands would be liabltl under assessment by the 
Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage District; while, upon 
the other hand, the builders would be entitled to compensa-
tion from that district for any excess expenditure over their 
due proportion which they might incur in the construction 
of the work." (Emphasis added.) 
In discussing the application of section 14 of article I of 
our Constitution to the factual situation in the Gray case, 
this court stated at pages 645 and 646 as follows: 
'" ... It is insisted, however, that a distinction should 
be made because of the provision of our constitution that 
"private property shall not be taken, appropriated or dam-
aged for public use without just compensation therefor" 
(Const. 1874, art. II, sec. 22). In reaching the conclusion 
above announced we are not unmindful of the constitutional 
provision, but where no right has been violated there is no 
injury for which the liability affords compensation and it 
is a case of an injury without damages.' The supreme court 
of Mississippi, under a constitutional provision like ours, 
where the acts complained of were the acts of its levee com-
missioners' in controlling the waters of the river whose name 
the state bears, has held that the land owner is not entitled 
to compensation because the construction of the levee renders 
the land between it and the river worthless for agriculture 
and necessitates the removal of houses on to the protected side 
of the levees. (Richardson v. Levee Oommrs., 68 Miss. 539, 
[9 South. 351].) 
"Nothing in any of our decisions in the slightest militates 
against this conclusion. Reardon v. San Francisco, 66 Cal. 
492, [56 Am. Rep. 109, 6 Pac. 317], contains a discussion of 
the meaning of the word 'damage' as newly placed in the 
constitution. The holding was that it applied to special con-
sequential damages which the owner of adjoining property 
received over and above the common injury to other abutters 
<m the street or the general public, by reason of a street 
improvement. It based its conclusion largely upon the views 
of the Supreme Court of Georgia, reference to which has 
hereinbefore been made. No difficulty arises over this case, 
which by its very language is limited to special damage occa-
.. 
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sioned to particular property which is not a common dama ge 
to all abutting property. Upon the other hand, in De Baker 
v. Southern Oalifornia Ry. 00., 106 Cal. 257, [48 Am. St. 
Rep. 237, 39 Pac. 610], this court in Bank, referring to the 
contention that because of the modification of our constitu-
tion, the doctrine of Green v. Swift, 47 Cal. 536, and Green 
v. State, 73 Cal. 29 [11 Pac. 602, 14 Pac. 610], and Lamb v. 
Reclamation District, 73 Cal. 125, [2 Am. St. Rep. 775, 14 
Pac. 625], were no longer the law, passed it by with the 
statement merely that, 'it is possible this may be true.' But 
'here and now, therefore, for the first time is the question 
presented, and for the reasons above given, we hold that the 
doctrine of damnum ,absque injuria is applicable to the pros-
pective temporary consequential damage which it may be 
found will be inflicted upon the plaintiffs' lands by the fu-
ture raising of a flood plane, which floods are of temporary 
duration and character, which raising the plaintiffs may pro-
tect themselves against, and which floods, in the progress of 
the work, will be taken care of so that future injury will 
be avoided, all this under the state's plan of vast magnitude 
and importance to abate, on behalf of the whole state, as ~'­
well as for the benefit of private land owners, including these 
plaintiffs, flood conditions, which, if unchecked, would in-
evitably lead, to the destruction of the navigability of the 
river and ,to the greater impairment and damage of all the 
adjacent ,.land. Further than this it is not necessary here 
tp go." (Emphasis added.) 
It should be apparent to anyone familiar with the factual 
situation, :in ,:the Gray case that it bears no similarity what~ 
ever to the' factual situation in the cases at bar and that 
therefore :the principles of law involved in that case are in 
nowise applicable to the cases now before us. 
In the cases at bar the improvement has directly caused 
the damage suffered by the plaintiffs. In the Gray case the 
improvement instead of causing damage to the plaintiff would 
ultimately ,result -in a benefit and improvement of his prop-
erty;' the damages involved being only prospective and tem-
porary and incidental to the construction of the improvement 
rather tJ?,an the improvement itself. Furthermore, as pointed 
out by this court in its decision in the Gray case, the plain-
,tiff, could protect, his property against the prospective tem-
p~rary damage to wlJ.ich his property was subjected, but the 
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plaintiffs in the cases at bar obviously had no such oppor-
tunity. 
I cannot refrain from adverting to the recent but grow-
ing tendency of some courts and judges toward the destruc-
tion of constitutional guarantees by the process of specious 
interpretation. It may be that such constitutional guarantees 
are obnoxious to the social or economic philosophy of the 
judge or judges deciding the particular cause; but I submit 
that it is for the people and not the courts to bring about 
changes in our Oonstitution. To invoke the police power 
as a justification for the taking or damaging of private prop-
erty for public use in violation of section 14 of article I of 
the Constitution of California is nothing less than amending 
the Constitution by judicial edict or nullification by sanction 
of law. 
In the cases at bar, the public agencies here involved con-
structed a drainage system presumably for the benefit of the 
public, or a portion thereof. Conceding that such system 
was properly and efficiently constructed and maintained, but 
its operation necessitated the flooding of plaintiffs' premises 
situated three miles away, under what possible theory can 
it be argued that plaintiffs' property was not damaged for 
the public purpose of maintaining said drainage system ~ If 
it was so damaged, defendants are liable to plaintiffs under 
section 14 of article I of our Constitution. If, on the other 
hand, the system was improperly or inefficiently constructed 
or maintained, and the flooding of plaintiffs' premises re-
sulted therefrom, the liability of defendants could be predi-
cated upon the provisions of the 1923 statute (Stats. of ] 923, 
p. 675, Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 5618), as well as the 
above-mentioned provision of the Constitution. In other 
words, defendants could not avoid liability for the damaging 
of plaintiffs' property because of their negligent conduct in 
the construction or maintenance of the public improvement 
if they would be liable therefor notwithstanding such negli-
gent conduct. 
Finally, it is stated in the majority opinion that the evi-
dence does not establish that the bridge maintained across 
the lagoon by one of the defendants was a contributory cause 
of the flooding of pI8,intiffs' lands. I have heretofore set 
forth the facts in these cases and they manifestly show that 
the bridge blocked the flow of the water and the debris 
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thereby caused .to collect was a contributing cause of the 
flooding. ' It must be remembered that these cases' are here 
0!l, ~pp~al from judgments entered after orders granting non-
suits; and' all the evidence must be viewed and every reason-
apl~. inference drawn favorably to plaintiffs. There is un-
, d'eniablysufficient evidence to require the submission of the 
cases to',t.}~e jury on that question of fact. 
I ~, " ' ',' ~ .' '. I' \'. • .' i 
:;J,mnniingup, we have cases where public agencies, with 
no'pr6p~iet'~ry right so to do, have collected surface waters 
9Y. the iA~t~llation' of drains, have discharged those waters 
'into anatll~al watercourse, and have failed to provide ade-
quate mea:Q.'~' of escape for those waters into the ocean well 
knowing' that' their ,'conduct would cause the flooding of 
plaintiffs' premises. As a result of that conduct, the waters 
discharged in the watercourse' exceeded its capacity and could 
not escape through the inadequate outlet, and plaintiffs' land 
and the improvements thereon, not riparian to the stream, 
being three miles away, and not having theretofore been 
subject to overflow by any of the waters, are flooded and dam-
aged. The majority decision is contrary to the firmly estab-
lished law in California and the weight of authority in other 
jurisdictions. I t will not only result in a grievous miscar-
riage of justice in the cases now under consideration, but will 
cause grea~ confusion in the law on the subject here involved. 
In my opinion the judgments should be reversed. 
CURTIS, J.-I concur in the conclusion reached in the 
dissenting opinion. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied December 
12, 1941. Curtis, J., and Carter, J., voted for a rehearing. 
Houser, J., did not participate therein. Spence, J., acting 
pro tem. 
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(1] Eminent Domain-Compensation-Necessity for and Right to 
-State Constitutional Guaranty.-Compensation for private 
property taken or damaged for public use must be mnde under 
Const. art. I, § 14, only when the taking or damaging is not 
so o~sential to the public health, safety, and morals as to be 
justified under the police power and the injury is one which 
would give rise to a cause of action by the owner if it were 
inflicted by a private person. 
Waters - Surface Waters - Protection Against - Confining 
Waters-Improvements in Stream-Diversion.-A lower ri-
parian owner has no redress for injury to his land caused by 
improvements in the stream when there has been no diversion 
of water out of its natural channel. 
Id.-Surface Waters-:-Protection Against-Public Improve-
ments - Increasing Velocity of Stream Waters.-A county 
flood control district which replaced dikes that bordered upon 
a river with concrete levees and constructed a concrete em-
bankment running at right angles to the levees, thereby ob-
structing the drainage of surface waters into the river, is not 
liable to property owners near the river, when due to heavy 
rainstorms and an inadequate outlet, the stream waters flowed 
at a speed heightened by the improvements, burst through the 
banks of the river and damaged the property, and the surface 
waters flooded it. 
[4] Id.-Surface Waters-Protection Against-Obstructing Flow. 
A private landowner may not obstruct the flow of surface 
waters that naturally drain aeross, his property from adjoin-
ing lands. 
[5] Id. - Surface Waters - Protection Against--:-Public Improve-
ments-Right to Obstruct Flow.-A governmental agency in 
constructing public improvements may validly exercise its 
police power to obstruct the flow of surface waters not run-
ning in a natural channel without making compensation for 
the resulting damages. 
[3] See 27 R. C. L. 1146. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Eminent Domain, § 43 (1); [2J 
Waters, §396; [3,5] Waters, §400; [4] Waters, §391; [6] Ap-
peal and Error, § 1431. 
